Pandemics and biosecurity

Pandemics have been part of the 'disruptive technologies' the Bulletin tracks since the 2000s, and Covid-19 brought them into the clock statement in 2021. Three possible origins, three levels of risk: nature, accident, intent.

What Covid revealed

A moderately lethal virus (~1% early on) killed around 20 million people (excess-mortality estimates, WHO and The Economist), halted the world economy and showed that international cooperation could collapse within weeks: hoarding of masks, vaccines and data. The Bulletin drew an uncomfortable lesson: this was only a rehearsal. A more contagious or more lethal agent would have overwhelmed every system.

Natural pandemics: the next one will come

Zoonoses (H5N1 avian flu, coronaviruses, Ebola, Nipah) are emerging more often than before: deforestation, intensive farming, globalisation. H5N1 has circulated in US dairy cattle since 2024 and infected humans; if it acquired efficient human-to-human transmission it would be far deadlier than Covid. The WHO put 'Disease X' — an as-yet-unknown agent — on its research priority list back in 2018. That is not science fiction, it is planning.

Lab leaks: the accident

Laboratories handling the most dangerous agents (BSL-4) have grown from a handful to around sixty worldwide, with no binding international standard. Documented leaks have happened: smallpox in Birmingham (1978), SARS in Beijing and Singapore (2003–2004), anthrax in Sverdlovsk (1979). Covid's origin remains debated, but the debate itself showed that accidental risk is taken seriously by scientists. The 'lab leak' card in the simulator refers to this scenario.

Synthetic biology: the intent

This is the scenario biosecurity experts fear most. The cost of DNA synthesis has fallen a thousandfold in twenty years; in 2017 a Canadian team reconstructed horsepox virus for $100,000 from mail-order sequences. AI models already assist molecule design. An agent combining contagiousness, lethality and a long incubation period is theoretically possible — and it is the only biological scenario that existential-risk researchers regard as potentially civilisation-scale.

What actually protects us

• Surveillance: wastewater sequencing (which spots a variant weeks before hospitals do), global sequence-sharing networks (GISAID), early warning. Cheap, highly effective, underfunded.
• Vaccines in 100 days: CEPI's goal is a vaccine 100 days after an agent is identified; Covid took 326 days.
• DNA order screening: checking that synthesised sequences do not match pathogens. Voluntary today; it should be mandatory.
• The WHO Pandemic Agreement, adopted in May 2025 after three years of talks: pathogen sharing in exchange for equitable vaccine access.

And at my scale?

Vaccination remains the individual act with the strongest collective effect (herd immunity). But the most underrated lever is informational: not passing on a health rumour, even 'to raise awareness', directly protects the collective response — the WHO identified misinformation as a mortality factor during Covid. See Act.